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PROPERTY AS A FUNDAMENTAL CIVIL RIGHT
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

INTRODUCTION:

THE GENERAL AND THE PARTICULAR

Property rights are clearly back on the public agenda as a subject for
discussion and debate. In many circles these rights are rightly regarded as
fundamental. One familiar statement of the centrality of property rights
comes found in Corfield v. Coryell,' in the context of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution: There,
Justice Bushrod Washington wrote that the clause encompassed privileges
which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments.... [These rights] may [all be] comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government,
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
propert

of every kind, ....

[and] to take, hold and dispose of proper-

Yet, even though the centrality of property rights has been rightly
praised, often there is little appreciation as to what that entails. Indeed often
when I lecture on the subject of property rights I am asked to give some
hard-hitting adversarial speech in which claims for property rights vanquish
everything in their wake. But if those are the expectations here, then I hope
to disappoint them. I think that the questions of understanding are prior to
the questions of political advocacy or support, and the subject of property
rights is a difficult one on which to obtain that clear understanding. Indeed,
one sign of the evident complexity of this issue is that people are often hard
pressed to articulate what is gained or lost when it is said that property is not
a fundamental civil right. In order to understand what is entailed by
regarding property as a fundamental civil right, it is necessary to describe the
variety and richness of property rights; only then is it possible to isolate the
features that give property rights their permanent salience and importance.

* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
This paper is a major revision of a speech that I gave to the Northwest Legal Foundation in
May, 1992. I should like to thank Jay Wright for his usual able research assistance.
1. 6 F. Cas. 546 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
2. Id. at 551-52. He then qualifies those rights by noting that these rights are "subject
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of
the whole." Id. at 552. This last clause is the soft underbelly of his position, and among its
weaknesses is its failure to state which restrictions should may be imposed without compensation, and which require it.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992

1

California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 1, Art. 7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

In this article, therefore, I address two major questions. In part one I
shall examine what a general theory of property rights has to say about the
anticipated shape and variety of property rights in different forms of
resources. In particular, I look at two features that I think account for the
importance of property rights, their universality and their utility, and show
how these relate to the traditional rules of property-acquisition, protection
and transfer. Part two then continues this inquiry by asking how the same
set of general considerations leads to a wide range of different solutions to
the property rights problem as we move away from land and chattels to other
natural resources or intangibles, such as information. Part three examines
two discrete and important areas of public regulation-land use planning and
government regulation of employment markets-in order to show how they
are inconsistent with the basic system of property rights (with all its own
internal diversity) developed in the first portion of the article.
One conclusion comes clear. Many of the naive theories about the
absolute nature of property rights are falsified by common social practices
and legal rules in dealing with property rights both for land,3 and especially
after the transition to natural resources, such as water and oil and gas, and
intellectual property. But none of the sensible legal adaptations of the
standard rules of property come close to offering any justification for the
extensive forms of government regulation that are routinely adopted and
defended with respect to both land use planning and labor markets. The
ideal state may not be as small as some defenders of the nightwatchman state
envision, but it is far smaller than the advocates of central government
planning propose.
I. WHY ARE PROPERTY RIGHTS FUNDAMENTAL?

What then are the indicia of fundamental rights? What are the threads
that link property rights together notwithstanding their apparent diversity?
In dealing with this question, two relevant characteristics require special
mention: universality and utility. They are highly correlated.
A. Universality
To call a right fundamental presupposes that it applies across a large
number of distinctive settings. The property rights that I shall speak about
here satisfy that condition because it is clear that all legal cultures, no matter
what their differences, have some conception of property rights. The
explanation for the pervasive nature of the institution lies in the fundamental
need, apparent across time and cultures, to separate me from thee. It is
almost impossible to think of a system of human interactions without a

3. For an exhaustive discussion of the interrelationship of common and private property in
land, see Robert C. Effickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 1993).
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system of property rights. Consider, for example, the rules and institutions
that would be rendered unintelligible without a system of property rights.
There could be no serious claims for autonomy of the person; there could be
no actions for trespass or for nuisance; it would be difficult, if not impossible
to construct prohibitions against theft, rape and murder. The state of the
nature of man was one which Hobbes described as a war of all against all,4
and the escape from that world is possible only through a robust system of
property rights.
There have been of course attacks upon the idea of property from many
modem socialists who, drawing on various strains of Marxist theories,
believe in the collective ownership of the means of production and regard the
abolition of private property as one of the central missions of the state.' But
in its extreme form this position must fail. No matter how much we wish to
separate the means of production from individual ownership, there is a sense
in which consumption is always an individual act. In all cultures and
societies, rules of property must be developed to decide who is entitled to
consume and use what things. That task is squarely faced in common and
civil law systems, which for all their differences, do have strong traditions
of private ownership. And it must be faced in the more communal structures
associated with many African or Indian tribes, 6 and with new colonies
established by pioneer groups.7 The problem must also be faced in modem
socialist systems, even if an economy is reduced to ruins by collective
ownership of the means of production. There is no similar necessity to have
collective means of production, given the inescapable nature of individual
acts of consumption. Only in wholly totalitarian regimes will private
property disappear without a trace.
In this setting, however, I do not want to speak about the survival of the
tag ends of a property system in some alien political environment. Instead
I wish to address the question of how a robust system of property rights
might be formulated and implemented. The system that I am about to
describe has its powerful roots in both the common and Roman law.' It
meets the test of universality not only because of its capacity to endure, but
also because of its comprehensive nature. A well-defined system of property
rights contains no gaps, that is, it does not leave open any areas in which the

4. His most well known exposition on this topic is found in THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
96-97 (Oxford 1558) (1651).
5. See, e.g., Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in KARL MARX:
SELECTED WRrIINGS 232, 237 (David McLellan ed. 1977).
6. See, e.g., MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN
RHODESIA (1955).
7. See Ellickson, supra note 3, noting the transition from collective to individual ownership
in the Jamestown and Plymouth colonies. There was a move from collective to individual
ownership of land, prompted by a healthy need for survival.
8. For a summary of the Roman Law materials, see BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION
ch. 3 (1962).

TO ROMAN LAW
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legal system cannot reach a principled decision.' The system which I wish
to describe is not a system of exploitation of one person by others. Quite the
opposite, one primary goal of a system of property is to provide islands of
independence that allow all individuals to pursue their own projects without
interference from others. The system of property rights thus imposes duties
upon everyone to respect the correlative rights of others. The trick is to
develop a system in which the rights created in the long run are worth more
than the correlative duties that are necessarily imposed. How then might this
be done?
In order to answer this question we cannot speak indefinitely at a high
level of abstraction. It is necessary to descend from these Olympian
generalities in order to address the more concrete issues that any system of
property rights must address. In particular the system of property rights
contains three broad classes of rules, each of which is designed to serve some
particular function:
1. Rules of Acquisition. First in any legal system are the rules that
determine who becomes the first owner of any property in question. The
rules of this sort have to deal with two issues. First, the legal system must
provide some rules to determine the ownership of individual persons, given
that the question of individual autonomy is not a self-evident or deductive
truth. Instead it represents some normative judgment on the desirability of
certain institutional arrangements. (Slavery may be an abomination, but it
is not a contradiction in terms.) Second, the legal system must supply rules
that call for the assignment of property rights in things external to the
individual-that is, in various kinds of physical and intellectual resources.
Here a legal system cannot simply announce that it is in favor of private
property. It must also indicate the ways in which it will match up particular
persons with particular things. Where a system of private property is
adopted, virtually all traditional legal systems have used a rule of first
possession (sometimes called the rule of initial occupation with land, or
capture with wild animals) to assign particular things to particular persons.10
This rule solves the identification problem in a cheap and efficient fashion,
and for many resources, the creation of private ownership increases the
chances that the resource in question will be developed in a sensible and

9. I discuss the comprehensive nature of property rights in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN chs. 5-7 (1985), and have been
attacked mightily
10. The literature on the first possession rule is enormous. The origins of the modem
discussion trace back to JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 5 ("Of Propert") (1690). See, e.g., RICHARD SCHLATrER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA
1951); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, UTOPIA ch. 7 (1974); LAWRENCE C. BECKER,
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS (1977); Richard A. Epstein, Possession as
the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of
Property, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 73 (1985).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss1/7

4

Epstein: Property Law Symposium -- Property as a Fundamental Civil Right

1992]

PROPERTY AS A FUNDAMENTAL CIVIL RIGHT

efficient fashion." The rule of first possession also prevents the concentration of all resources in the hands of a single person or even in the hands of
a government, and thus leads to the decentralization of power which is
generally a precondition for successful democratic government. The rule of
first possession has often been attacked as excessively egoistic," but despite
its ostensible individualistic orientation, the rule advances overall social
welfare in a broad range of contexts.' 3
Although private property may generally offer the preferred solution,
and first possession the rule by which to achieve it, there are nonetheless still
instances where more complex forms of property holdings, including various
forms of common ownership, may be preferred. We cannot assume that all
things in the initial position should be subject to private ownership. Indeed
any theory of property rights will be inadequate if it only allows for private
property. Throughout history, all legal systems have postulated that certain
things are not subject to private ownership-the air and the sea, or even the
town walls, ordinary language, mathematical theorems. A sound theory of
property rights must leave some place for rules of common as well as rules
of private ownership. There are cases where the cost of exclusion is high
relative to its social benefits.
2. Rules of Protection. The property rights that are acquired are only
of value if the holder of these rights is in a position to preserve their use
against all comers. Thus there are legal rules to protect the autonomy of the
person, to protect exclusive rights of possession in privately owned property,
whether land, chattels or intangibles, and to protect the fractional interest that
any individual enjoys in property that is held in common. The creation of
this tort system is in a sense strictly correlative with the system of property
rights. And its importance cannot be underestimated. The rules of trespass
and nuisance are for the protection of property interests, and they insure that
once the rights in property have been assigned to one person, as by the rules
of initial acquisition or (as will be seen) by subsequent transfer, they cannot
be taken or destroyed by another individual. Without the system of
protection afforded by the rules of tort, there is no stability of expectations
in any system of property rights. And without that stability, there will be no
investment in useful or productive activities.
The emphasis on the rules of protection in turn raises many of the
classical issues of the law of torts. When it is said, for example, that one
person is not allowed to take or damage the property of another individual,
there is always the question as to how far that protection extends. I am not
entitled to break your vase with a hammer, but what if I shake the table on
which it rests so that it falls and breaks, or push another person into it, so
11. See Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1959) on the advantages of the decentralized control of the spectrum.
12. See, e.g., Becker & Schlatter, supra note 10.
13. So argued for in Richard A. Epstein, The UtilitarianFoundations of Natural Law, 12
HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 713 (1989).
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that again it is destroyed? In other cases, as when I force someone else to
undertake dangerous actions, there is some question as to whether harm is
caused by me or whether it is self-inflicted, with very different consequences
on the question of liability. The range of acts and events that could combine
with my conduct to cause harm has to be considered in meticulous detail, and
is one of the major issues of the law of torts, usually considered under the
rubric of proximate causation.14 Its details are not our concern here.
Indeed a system of property can, and has survived, with some ambiguity on
just this type of issue. All legal systems acknowledge some role for the law
of torts.
3. Rules of Transfer. There is a third set of rules that are necessary to
complete a system of property rights. No economy, no social system should
be regarded as static. Oftentimes, property rights are more valuable in the
hands of a third party than they are in the hands of their initial owner.
Behind the system of transfer is the basic logic of the system of contract law.
The state enforces and respects contracts, not because there is some special
magic to promises, independent of the consequences attached to their use.15
Instead when promises are made, the state has strong reason to believe that
both parties anticipate gains from trade. It is those gains that lend dynamism
to the system, and explain why a strong moral force attaches to the institution
of promising. No such instinct would exist if the transfer of property rights
by voluntary exchange were thought to be the prelude to their waste or
destruction. But once we know that gains do attach to trade, then a legal
system should aid, not hinder, the cheap and efficient voluntary turnover of
goods and services. The mechanism of contract can aid the process of trade
by allowing these exchanges to take place over time. If I can deliver goods
today on the enforceable promise of being paid tomorrow, then we both
enjoy the freedom to rearrange our affairs over the dimension of time, to our
mutual benefit. 6 Credit is therefore a power concomitant of voluntary
exchange, as the close connection between the law of sales and the law of
personal guarantees and security interests in real and personal property
attests. 17
The gains from the one transaction can be replicated in other similar
transactions, and so long as we are confident that strangers to the original
14. On which, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-462 (1977). There are many
exhaustive surveys of the subject, of which perhaps the best known is H.L.A. HART & TONY
HONORE, CAUSATION INTHE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
15. For efforts to bolster up the moral theory of premises, see PATRICK S. ATIYAH,
PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981).
16. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Self-Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 19
J. LEGAL STUD. 583 (1990).
17. For some of the complications of this literature, see Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T.
Kronman, Secured Financing and PrioritiesAmong Creditors, 88 YALE, L.J. 1143 (1979);
Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CIE. L. REV. 645
(1992); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of SecuredDebt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984);
George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225 (1992).
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exchange are not on balance left worse off by them (at which point there is
a risk from excessive trade), then we should encourage voluntary exchange
across the board, and with it the formation, over broad domains of activity,
of a market economy.
Within this basic framework, the rules of transfer have two distinct
roles. In part these rules are designed to determine, first whether the interest
in question is one that should be transferrable, and second the mechanics
whereby transfer of these interests can take place. The system for transfer
thus involves the entire law of contract, and also systems of public support,
such as recordation, which allows the transfers to take place while giving
notice to third parties about the state of the legal title. But as before, we
cannot assume that it is desirable for all rights to be separately transferable,
even though that might often be the case. The theory in question must
recognize that there could be certain cases in which the proper solution calls
for inalienable rights, chiefly in those cases where the transfer of property
results in an increased risk of harm to third persons."8 Thus in many
instances a tenant is not allowed to transfer his leasehold interest because of
the damage that could be done to the landlord's reversion; vendors are not
allowed to sell guns to children or incompetents, or perhaps to anyone at all;
tavern owners are restricted in the persons to whom they can sell liquor, and
the times at which they may remain open for business. In each case the logic
is the same: the transfer from A to B creates a risk of serious harm to C,
for which a damage remedy against B, after the fact, may offer too little, too
late.
B. Utility
The basic system of property rights is fundamental not only because it
is comprehensive, but also because it allows resources to reach their highest
and best use with the minimum level of friction. In order to understand
why, it is necessary to step back from the system and recall the two parts of
the Coase19 Theorem, where we deal with zero and positive transaction costs
settings.

1. A Frictionless World
The first half of Coase's argument is that where the costs of subsequent
renegotiation are zero, there is no reason to worry about the rules that
govern the initial distribution of property rights under the rule of acquisition
discussed in section A(1). The rule of transfer in section A(3) could be
costlessly applied in order to shift the resources to the person who values
them most. The same process can be undertaken an infinite number of

18. See Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985).

19. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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times, which leads to the optimal reconfiguration of rights regardless of their
original location. Protection of property rights under the tort rules in section
A(2) is also no problem because it is possible to have perfect enforcement of
any system of property rights at zero cost. And perfect enforcement means
there will be no violation of the rights in the first place.
2. A Friction-Filled World
Subsequent transactions are, however, often very costly which is one
reason why questions of initial allocation matter. Where the wrong system
of allocation is adopted, subsequent transactions may be blocked. So a
question of initial allocation that is regarded with supreme indifference in a
zero transaction cost world now becomes an issue of abiding importance. It
is necessary to come as close as possible to the ideal assignment of rights in
order to minimize the costs of correcting initial errors in allocation? The
system of property rights is fundamental because its structure determines the
wealth and fortunes of its individuals. Where that system allows for smooth
and effective transfers, it will increase its overall utility, regardless of the
initial assignment of rights.

HI. THE FORMS OF PROPERTY-BOTH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
A. The Land Fallacy-OrShould All Property be Held Privately?
1. Land Again
In sketching the outline of the theory of property, I have thus far stressed
the usual trinity of incidents associated with it: possession, use and
disposition. The tendency on the part of many thinkers is to follow the
example of Locke' and to assume that all property rights should assume
this form, and that all things, subject to ownership, should be taken out of
the commons as quickly as possible by one distinct owner who can use or
exchange that property, whichever yields him the higher value.
The classical conception of property thus gives to its owner three
attributes, exclusive possession, exclusive use and full rights of alienation by
sale, gift, will and the like.' In addition, rights of land tend to be defined
comprehensively in that they cover more than the surface of the land, but
include air and mineral rights as well. The common law maxim is, cuius est

20. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 (1972).
21. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOvERNMENT, Book II, Chap. 5 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1988) (3rd ed. 1698). There are of course communitarian strands in Locke that require extended
evaluation, on which see Laslett's introduction, supra at 102-09.
22. This conception dates back to Roman times. See FREDERICK H. LAWSON & BERNARD
RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 8-9 (2d ed. 1982).
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solum euis est usque ad coelum et usque ad inferos-so that possession of the
land extends from the center of the earth to the heavens.' For land this
regime is generally a desirable one in that the rule of acquisition thus gives
each plot of land clear boundaries and a single owner capable of using or
trading the property, as the case may be. But here too one must be careful
because the common law rules on boundary disputes are often more complex
than this simple model would apply.' For example, neighboring owners
of land are usually subject to reciprocal easements of support, so that no one
can dig out to the boundary if his neighbor's land will fall in.'
The
reciprocal nature of these easements is not designed to create a form of
collective ownership, much less socialism, in land. Instead the creation of
the easement comes from the recognition that support rights (a) are generally
worth more than they cost, and (b) they are very difficult to negotiate
consensually when individual plots of land can have multiple neighbors. It
is the positive transaction cost environment that shifts the law away from the
very austere systems of private property into more complex systems. And
this shift is a good thing so long as the deviation from the system of absolute
rights satisfies conditions (a) and (b).
Further deviations from the system of private ownership also have to be
considered.
One important illustration involves agricultural societies,
especially in uncertain times, where holding land in commons may be
preferable to private ownership. Common ownership does not create a freefor-all, for membership in the commons can be strictly limited, and the
practices of members to the commons strictly regulated. In addition,
common ownership may be preferable to strict private ownership where the
risk of crop failure is high, and diversification of holdings provides some
insurance against starvation that follows from a wipeout. The medieval
system of open or common fields gave each owner access to small portions
of several different tracts of land. In so doing it increased the cost of
operation relative to a single set of concentrated holdings.
But that

23. See id. at 21. Lawson and Rudden note that, even for agriculture, land only has value
in three dimensions. The problems with this rule arise most acutely in the cave cases, where
the entrance to the cave may be on the land of one person, and the entry on the land of another.
See for that situation, Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1929), awarding ownership to the
surface owner who does not control the mouth of the cave. For extended criticism, see Richard
A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase,
35 J. L. & ECON. (1993)(fortheoming).
24. On cost of policing boundaries, see Ellickson, § B. 1, supra note 3.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 817-821 (1977) for an elaboration of the rules.
For an insightful analysis, see Corporation of Birmingham v. Allen, L. R. 6 Ch.D. 284 (Ch.
App. 1877) (Jessel, M.R.).
26. See the excellent study CARL J. DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND 4-8,

21-23 (1980), which rightly looks for efficiency explanations that can explain the existence of
both common (for grazing) and separate properties (for crops) at the same time, and which
attempts to correlate the shifts from open fields with shifts in both costs and demand. His
explanation dwells heavily on transaction costs. The open or common fields (common only to
the members of the village, as all others were excluded) were used for cattle grazing, where
large tracts were needed, and the costs of negotiating separate licenses for each entry were

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992

9

California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 1, Art. 7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

diversification did provide a benefit in bad years, because it reduced the great
risk of death from famine. The systems of landholdings were responsive to
the risks at hand. Indeed there are some cultures in which land will be
operated in common when some crops are grown, but operated privately
when other crops are grown in other seasons. The common ownership,
sanctioned as it is by custom should be viewed very differently from state
collective ownership, which is doubtless far less efficient in its operation, if
only because it does not respond to the diversification problem.
2. Oil and Gas
The system of property rights in land must be applied with caution for
other reasons as well. As noted above, the initial rule of allocation is one of
first possession, which seems to work as well with land as any other.
Nonetheless one weakness of this rule of initial acquisition has always led to.
a certain uneasiness, even with respect to land: what about the position of
those who lose in the race to acquire first possession? In part the answer is
that these persons will gain through voluntary exchange with persons who
have acquired by first possession. But in other cases the concern with the
outsiders is still more insistent. In dealing with such resources as water, or
oil and gas, there is a genuine concern that the use of individual rules of
acquisition will destroy the value of the very resource that persons want to
reduce to private ownership.
For oil and gas the story has been told many times.' A rule that
encourages surface owners to drill for all the oil they can get will lead to
excessive investment in wells. Individual owners will drill by the edges of

their plots in order to siphon off oil and gas from under their neighbor's
land. The efforts one party undertakes will be countered by similar efforts
of others, and much of the value of the field could be destroyed by these
individual acts, thereby disturbing the geological layers of oil and gas. In
some instances, voluntary contracts could lead the various owners to stay
their hands, but often (when the number of surface owners exceeds about
five) there will be abiding disagreement as to which owners should be
entitled to what percentage of the oil.' A system that moderates the first
possession rule and requires the owners to pool their resources may well be
preferred to the individualistic rule. The case for first possession rules is
thus weakened by the striking negative externalities that it creates. Now the
prohibitive. Arable land could be divided into smaller spaces because there were no gains to
shared uses. Id. at 7. See also J.A. YELLING, COMMON FIELD AND ENCLOSURE IN ENGLAND
1450-1850 (1977).
27. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER. OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 219-23 (1985); GARY D. LEBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 93114 (1989). For a case law account of some of the developments, see Hammonds v. Central
Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934).
28. Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common Pool:
Prorationingof Crude Oil Production, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 87 (1984).
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often intractable coordination problems among the surface owners call for
some purposive change in the ownership rules, and incline us to some
collective solution, such as well-spacing regulations or unitization systems
that9 limit the amount of drilling that any owner can do on his own proper2
ty.
3. Water Rights
At the time when private ownership was unquestioned for land, water
rights were often held in common.' All riparians were entitled to make
limited use of the water from the stream; all had to reduce their take pro rata
in the event of scarcity; none could exclude others from fishing their portion
of the river; navigable streams could be used by the public at large without
the consent of the individual riparians. This complex system of private and
collective rights is best explained by looking at the positive transaction costs
model. 3' Given the basic knowledge that one has of water in a country like
England, one must inquire which system of property rights is likely to
maximize the value of in-stream (e.g. fishing) and out of stream uses of
water (e.g. drinking). The proof of the proposition is that these property
rights do not survive in other physical environments. More intensive
instream uses were subsequently allowed in America once mills become a
viable source of power, and the entire system of appropriation shifted to first
come, first served in the American West when the riparian uses of the water
are of little value. In Hawaii the local customary law is different still, to
reflect the dominant fact that water flows, not in ordinary rivers, but down
discrete paths from the top of the mountains.32
The variation in systems of property rights, each attuned to its own
location should be the source of both confidence and caution. There is good
reason to believe that some system of property rights is critical in all social
settings. But at the same time, it is clear that there is no single permanent
set of property rights in water that is good for all occasions. The variation
is greater than commonly supposed by many property rights supporters, but
for reasons that depend on increased value of use, and not income or wealth
distribution.

29. Discussed at length in CHARLES DONAHUE JR., Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 325-59 (1974).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 41, topic 3 scope note and introductory note

(1977).
31. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Energy and Effciency in the Realignment of Common-Law
Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990).
32. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1973); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753
F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985).
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C. Other Forms of Common Ownership: PropertyRights in Information
It should be evident to us all that the form in which wealth is held has
changed radically in the present century. Whereas once land and physical
assets were the dominant form of wealth, today they have a new competitor-information. If Boeing Airlines represents the giant of the last
generation, Microsoft Corporation represents a colossus of the present
generation. Its assets are largely intangible and consists of know-how, trade
secrets, patents, copyrights and the like. This rise of information as a source
of wealth places new strains on the system of property rights, for the
standard rules applicable to land often work very poorly for information. In
dealing with land the dominant metaphor comes from agriculture: no person
should reap what he has not sown." The point of the metaphor is that no
one will sow crops where others are able to exclude him from the harvest.
The protection of property rights at the time of harvest is therefore necessary
to incur the investment at planting time and before. Only exclusive rights in
the produce of labor will induce that labor in the first place.
With information the situation is more complex. Quite simply, the
ordinary right to exclude comes at a far greater cost than it does in the land
situation. Information, once produced, can be reproduced quite costlessly.
Hence the metaphor of reaping where one has not sown does not have quite
the bite that it does in the agricultural system where it first arose. With
agriculture, only one person can reap, and a rule that entitled the sower to
reap was necessary to insure that a person earned a return on his initial
labor. But with information, many people can reap at the same time without
destroying the value of the information. Here the tradeoff between the
incentives to produce and the ability to disseminate information that has
already been produced are much more acute. A rule that grants the initial
creator exclusive rights will produce more information. But the information
will be of less overall social value because some people will be excluded
from using it, even though the cost of their use is very low, perhaps close to
zero. The reason for the exclusion is that the creator of the right will insist
upon payment for its use, where the payment will be above its marginal
cost-given that the information has already been created. There is,
therefore, an inescapable dilemma in this area of property rights. In order to
increase the likelihood that new information will be created, it is necessary
to reduce its value once it is created.
The entire system of property rights tends to show the uneasy compromise between these competing goals. In some cases there is no protection

33. See for its use in the context of intellectual property, International News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The metaphor is discussed in Douglas G. Baird,
Common Law Intellectual Propertyand the Legacy of InternationalNews Service v. Associated
Press, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 411 (1983); Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v.
Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of PropertyRights in News, 78 VA. L. REv. 85,
112-117, 122-23 (1992).
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at all. Persons use a language freely without paying others who have
invented the terms that have increased its richness.'
Mathematical
theorems and proof are usually in the public domain. The inventor of the
number '0' received no cash payoff for his great innovation, much less a
licensing fee each time the digit is used. A similar fate befell the inventor
of Arabic numerals. A system of private property rights in ordinary
language would so Balkanize exchange that we would all be the worse off for
it. Far better it is therefore to use the system of awards to note those who
have made contributions above and beyond the ordinary. One obvious
source of gain is employment opportunities at prestigious universities, and
another is prizes and honors of which the Nobel Prizes are perhaps the most
conspicuous examples.
In other cases the protection afforded by the legal system is partial but
not absolute. The systems of patents and copyrights both start with the
assumption that infinite protection of the covered invention or writing is too
excessive, largely because of the future uses that it excludes. 5 Yet both
systems desire to preserve the incentive to innovate and therefore give some
protection at the front end. The duration of the protection tends to differ,
with longer periods rightly given to copyrights than to patents, on the theory
that a given work of art is likely to be unique, while an invention is normally
something that other individuals will be able to develop in the fullness of
time. One could quibble about the optimal length of the protection period,
but for these purposes the critical point is this: With land the ideal period
for ownership is infinite, so that there are no complications that arise at the
expiration of some arbitrarily defined term. But with information, the total
exclusion for an indefinite period, however appropriate for land, comes at
too high a price and legal systems everywhere make adjustments to that fact;
of which the most important is perhaps the term limitations for patents and
copyrights.
The right of publicity-which protects the ability of a person to use his
name or likeness for commercial success-also shows a similar ambiguity.36
These rights are profitably analyzed along two separate dimensions: Time
and use. On the first issue, the temporal dimension, these rights are
normally well protected during life, so that one person is not allowed to
exploit the name or likeness of another for commercial advantage. Yet there
is a genuine ambiguity as to whether the right of exploitation survives
death." The cases tend to be split on the matter because the same tradeoff
arises. The ability for exclusive commercial exploitation during life is a

34. See, for discussion, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 332-33 (1989).
35. Id. at 361-63.
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
37. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v Pro Arts, Inc. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1979)(recognizing
right); C. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc. Inc. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (opposing
recognition of the post mortem right).
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large incentive to develop specific traits that are desired by others. Yet the
insistence of the license cuts off the use that others might make of that name
or likeness. Is the effect on incentives so great to justify keeping the
exclusivity after death? Here again there is a split of authority in the cases,
one which fully reflects the close empirical question that underlies the choice.
Similarly these property rights in names and likeness are restricted to
commercial exploitation, which again reveals the qualified character of the
property right. 8 It is not as though no person is allowed to mention or to
criticize, or report on, the affairs of another individual without his consent.39 Gossip about public figures is done without leave. Book reviewers
do not have to obtain permission of the author before they damn or praise his
work, and politicians, entertainers and others who choose to enter the public
eye cannot insist on monopoly control of their name or likeness in the
ordinary press. This middle position is again based on sensible empirical
compromises. The public tends to lose if criticism and commentary are
stifled, but there is no corresponding public interest in allowing commercial
exploitation by strangers, where there is no incentive to build or tear down
reputations as the case may warrant: whatever name-value the individual
acquires or maintains, it is his to sell if he chooses.
The common law has also developed, but only in qualified form,
property rights in news stories that have been acquired by labor.' Normally these stories are protected, even when the copyright laws are inapplicable
or of no assistance, so that one paper cannot lift a rival's story for its own
use. But the same body of law allows anyone to read the stories in other
papers for leads that it then may investigate independently. Here the
prohibition applies only to direct competitors, but does not restrict subsequent users from making use of the stories so published in their own work,
even if it is for commercial use, so long as the copyright law is not interfered
with. 41 Again the accommodation is an imperfect, but necessary effort to
trade off between the gains that property rights create (the incentive to search
for information) from the losses that they impose (the restrictions on use that
any price system necessarily imposes).
IV.

PROPERTY RIGHTS, LAND PLANNING, AND SOCIALISM

A. Common PropertyRights Do Not Callfor Government Control
In dealing with the various permutations of property rights, I have
indicated that there are many settings in which common property is

38. See, e.g., Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 400 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1980).
39. Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 300 Ore. 452, 712 P.2d 803 (1986).
40. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
41. United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max Inc. 749 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir.
1984).
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preferable to private property, and still other settings where a mix of
common and private property seems best. In setting out that conclusion, it
is important to remember that there is a critical difference between common
property and property that is subject to government ownership and control.
Thus, when one says that mathematical theorems are common property, he
does not mean that the government as the representative of the people is
permitted to determine who may use those ideas and who may not. It only
means that all persons can use those ideas, without payment to anyone else,
whenever they please. Similarly when patents and copyrights give limited
use to private owners, they do not contemplate any direct system of
government ownership or control of inventions or writings. Instead the
understanding is clear that, within the limited domains of time and use
specified by the law, the owner of the patent or copyright can exclude,
develop, license or sell the protected interest in whatever way he sees fit.
By the same token when matters covered by a patent or copyright fall into
the public domain, they do not become subject to government ownership.
As with ordinary language and novel phrases they become part of the public
domain: any person can use them as he or she chooses, no questions asked,
and no permissions required.
Any full account of property rights as they have developed at common
law and by statute in a market-driven society thus recognizes a level of
variation that is far greater than one might suppose from looking at the rules
of land and chattels, where exclusive and infinite rights are the order of the
day. It is therefore important to note that the variety in these property rights
should not be understood as an open license for the state to redefine property
rights in ways that vest the ownership of resources in government instead of
individuals. A couple of points should be made.
B. PropertyRights to Reduce BargainingDifficulties:
Land Use and Land Use Planning
The many forms of property rights that are observed for different
resources are developed with a single end in view: to minimize the
bargaining difficulties that could stand in the way of efficient deployment of
property rights. The point is of great importance in one of the most
controversial topics in Washington state (where this lecture was first
delivered) and through much of the nation. It concerns the aggressive effort
to increase land use controls through zoning and other forms of government
permits and restrictions.42 All laws of this sort have the unfortunate
consequence of creating regrettable stalemates. The state is not allowed to
occupy or use the land, but the owner can use it only if he obtains govern-

42. For a collection of relevant materials, see ROBERT ELUICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK,
LAND-USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1981).
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ment approval. The government has no use rights, but virtually unchallenged
veto rights.
This distribution of power between owners and government in the land
use context has the unhappy consequence of creating a bilateral monopoly
situation in which protracted negotiations and bitterness are the order of the
day. The individual must obtain the concurrence of the state to move
forward, and there is little check on the reasons why the permission to
develop will be granted or denied. The system of land planning is a form of
socialism in microcosm. Such a system is based on the idea that all use
rights are not held by individuals, but are subject to veto and control by the
state. The inefficiencies of central planning have been clearly revealed by
the failure of socialism to satisfy the wants of its people everywhere that it
has been tried. There is no reason to believe that it will, or can, work better
when applied to the limited domain of land use. One can have systems that
control against pollution and other forms of nuisance without embarking on
a system of comprehensive land use planning and control.
Oftentimes this system of extensive regulation is justified on the ground
that landowners do not take into account externalities-the harms that their
own actions cause to neighbors.43 No one doubts, given the concern with
the protection of property through the tort law, that ownership of property
does not confer the untrammelled right to do with it what one pleases. It
hardly justifies murder to say that the killer bought the bullet from its true
owner. But there are other situations where the claims of externalities are
stretched, to say the least. One important issue concerns the question of
habitat. A person owns land which serves as a valuable breeding ground for
an endangered species, or a watering hole for migratory birds. The
landowner may entertain development that could hamper the access that
natural species has to the land.
It is commonplace among environmentalist to say that the use of this
land by natural species is sufficient to prevent the development of the land
because of the external harms that might thereby be caused.' But here, in
effect, the argument is that the wildlife has an easement of sorts over the
land in question, although it is never clear where that easement comes from,
or how it is created. The better view of the subject is to recognize that
habitats have value, and then for that state to pay the owner of the land if it
desires these to be preserved. One desirable effect is that landowners will
no longer be loath to discover that their own land has some valuable attribute
that others desire, for they will no longer find that the value of their own
interest in the land will shrink as the social value of the land improves. The
government budgets that are today spent on endless amounts of environmental litigation could be directed to the cheaper purchase of the necessary

43. Starting with Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
44. Geoffrey L. Harrison, The Endangered Species Act and Ursine Usurpations: A Grizzly
Tale of Two Takings, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1101 (1991).
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property interests from owners who should, if the price is right, be only too
happy to sell. And the government, if faced by the price requirement, will
scale down its demands, and relent on the extravagant demands that it too
often makes. The current attitude is that all good things should be obtained
by coercion. The more sensible attitude is one that creates these interests by
purchase.
But it seems that there is little to hold back the tide of impending
regulation. The difficulties with zoning, planning and litigation might lead
the disinterested and pragmatic observer to reevaluate the success of the
current policies. But instead the recent trends have been to expand the range
and ambition of the planning process. In Washington state, for example, the
major controversies are over the proper strategies for the implementation of
the Washington Growth Management Act (GMA).' As the first word of
the statute applies, Growth Management is to be done at the state as well as
at the regional or local level. The introduction of a second (or perhaps) third
layer of bureaucracy can only increase the costs of the operation. Listening
to the comments about the Growth Management Act in Washington state, I
am impressed with the inability to identify the level of government which
should be held accountable in any given case.' The local governments all
protest that any restrictions on use that they impose are not their fault,
because they act under a mandate from the state government which requires
extensive planning on their part.4' But the state says that it only creates
guidelines and leaves local governments a fair degree of freedom. And all
branches of state government will argue that their land use restrictions are
redundant if some federal environmental statute is involved.
This system creates massive dislocations for individual owners. One
common complaint that I heard was that the federal government will not
examine its restrictions until all clearances for development have been
granted at the state level." A system of multiple vetoes has thus arisen in
the area of land use development and management. If all government agents
were regarded as private tortfeasors, then the rule of joint and several
liability would hold each responsible for the entire loss, and leave it to the
various levels of government to battle it out among themselves once the
compensation is paid to the aggrieved landowner.4 9

But owing to the

presumption of good faith of all regulators, no one is forced to shoulder the
responsibility, as each regulator is allowed to hide behind the actions of the

45. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 36.70A (1991).
46. See, e.g., WASHINGTON STATE GROWTH STRATEGIES COMMISSION, A GROWNH STRATEGY
FOR WASHINGTON STATE (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter GROWrH STRATEGIES].

47. See id. at4. ("Local, regional and state planning must be strengthened and coordinated.")

Note the impersonal passive, which ignores the question of who should do the work, or how it

should be financed.
48. The comment was made repeatedly in the discussion session after I had given the original
version of this talk.
49. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978).
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other. If the purpose of a system of property rights is to facilitate use and
to facilitate voluntary transactions, the systems of social control here are
sadly wide of their mark.
The question is whether one can find any intelligent social policy that
justifies the administrative pyramid and buckpassing that is created. Even if
we take as given that property may assume protean forms to respond to the
externality and coordination problems that were discussed above, it is
unlikely that this complex system regulation will pick these out, or, if it
does, correct them. There is no effort to single out cases in which pollution
or similar problems are likely to cause damage at locations far removed from
their sources. There is no recognition that the owner of land Will in the first
instance bear the costs, and obtain the benefits, of decisions made on land
use allocation. And there is no recognition that landowners will therefore
have better (not perfect, but better) incentives to make sound decisions on
resource use and development than any ponderous and remote planning
process.
Even a casual peek at the policies behind the Washington GMA suggests
that the implementation of any consistent growth plan is far more likely to
create massive shifts in wealth within and across regions and locales than it
is to prevent any tort-like injury. Indeed the long list of objectives that
government at all levels are supposed to take into account-environmental
quality, historical preservation, open spaces, critical habitat'-gives
sufficient discretion to allow any decision to be made in any case, leaving
individual landowners and firms wholly uncertain as to their rights, and
wholly unprotected against the pervasive risk of favoritism and faction. Nor
is there any recognition that these ends on any wish list may well be
inconsistent with each other, and with the capacity to maintain the economic
prosperity needed to generate the wealth on which the success of these
programs ultimately rests. One virtue of the market system is that land use
changes when the relative value of use continues to change. But the
supporters of Washington GMA take quite the opposite tack, and think that
shifts in land uses cause only losses, without creating offsetting gains for the
persons who buy the lands in question.5 ' One consequence of this view is
a categorical support for the status quo that requires "all regions of the state
prevent growth and development from encroaching on identified agricultural
and forest lands."52 The jockeying for deciding which lands will be kept
growth free and which will not will create enormous political struggles, and
the utter unwillingness to pay compensation to owners of restricted lands will
only convert these political struggles into knock-down drag out fights.
Similar problems will be created in urban areas. For some reason the
supporters of Growth Management regard the separation of cities as a goal

50. GROWTH STRATEGIES, supra note 46, at 4-5,

51. Seeid. at S.
52. Id.
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to be achieved at great cost. 3 Their proposals will result in certain lands
being off limits to construction. Similarly, there is some unexamined
assumption that high concentrations of individuals in small regions will
reduce the cost of providing a suitable infrastructure s -as if the marginal
cost continues to decline indefinitely regardless of the population densities.
Having created innumerable obstacles to normal construction, the supporters
of Growth Management then announce their support to a new set of subsidies
for moderate and middle-income home ownership, and propose the use of
home equity loans to allow the state to recover its subsidies at some later
time-creating further incentives against property improvement. 5 But the
subsidies awarded in one breath are taken away by a set of excise and sales
taxes in the next.' There are of course no concrete ways to authorize this
massive level of state involvement-only general exhortations that some
"processes" be found.

At all points there is, however, an undefended

conviction that the ultimate distribution of housing and industry can be rigged
from the center without the information about relative uses that can be

supplied by market mechanisms.57 There is far too great a confidence that

government can determine outcomes and no appreciation of how the

definition and delineation of property rights allows persons to make better
choices on their own. The net effect will be to induce people to flee to other

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id. at 7.
Id. at 10.
See id. at 29-30.
Id.
See, e.g., proposed amendment 1.2:
Growth within urban areas. Urban areas should be humane and attractive, culturally
diverse and economically vital. Urban areas should be compact, have concentrated
employment centers, and provide opportunities for people to live in a variety of
housing types close to where they work. Plans should ensure an adequate supply of
land for jobs and housing. Development densities should be sufficient to preserve
open space, promote affordable housing and transit, and ensure efficient use of
infrastructure. New development should be designed to respect the planned and
existing character of neighborhoods. Open spaces and natural features should be preserved and public parks should be provided within urban areas.

GROWTH STRATEGIES, supra note 46, at 20.
The comparisons to the defunct Soviet Constitution are irresistible:
Article 44. Citizens of the USSR have the right to housing.
This right is ensured by the development and upkeep of state and socially-owned
housing; by assistance for co-operative and individual house building; by fair distribution, under public control, of the housing that becomes available through fulfillment
of the programme of building well-appointed dwellings, and by low rents and low
charges for utility services. Citizens of the USSR shall take good care of the housing
allocated to them.
The major difference between the old Soviet and the Washington State proposals is that the latter
is far more interventionist than the former, given their willingness to exert control over the
layout of towns and communities, and the pattern of land use and transportation everywhere.
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jurisdictions, or not to enter the state at all, because of the onerous nature of
the burdens in question." No defects in the ordinary rules of private
property justify so grotesque a program of central planning.
C. LaborMarkets
The mistakes that are made in land use contexts are often carried over
to labor markets, with equally little justification. The great strength of
competitive labor markets is that freedom of entry and exit reduces the
complicated bargaining games that otherwise take place. But the various
forms of government regulation of labor markets make doing business in this
context as bizarre and complicated as land development. The labor statutes,
which impose collective bargaining on workers and firms, only complicate
bargaining difficulties by creating monopoly power on both sides of the
market, leading to excessive bargaining costs, and in the end bargaining
breakdown that too often manifests itself in lockouts and strikes. 9 Similarly, various systems of price and rent controls, or of minimum wages,
generate both shortages and queues as prices are not allowed to rise, or
wages allowed to fall, to market clearing levels.
It is possible to take the critique further. The modem civil rights laws,
which all take as their central proposition that it is improper to refuse to do
business with another person on certain forbidden grounds: race, sex,
ethnicity, age, handicap, and the like, are in fact the very antithesis of civil
rights as that term has been used here.'o The conception of civil rights that
I defend is one that speaks about the capacity to own and acquire property,
and to contract for its use and disposition. These are rights held by all
persons in the original position, and ones on which government should not
be allowed to tread. The modern civil rights laws should be understood as
collective and misguided efforts to limit the normal bundle of rights
associated with property, without identifying any of the problems of
bargaining breakdown that might justify a different form of property rights,
such as those reviewed above. The net effect of these laws is to expand
enormously the scope of government power and control in ways that allow
faction to dominate public and private lives, at enormous cost to both liberty
and efficiency, which are here so closely entwined.

58. See, e.g., letter from Forrest G. Coffey, Vice President for Governmental Affairs, Boeing
Airlines to Tim Hill, Executive, King County Washington (May 26, 1992) (on file with
California Western Law Review) (explaining the adverse consequences of the act on the firm and
its ability to obtain housing for its workers, and that the new Boeing testing ground will be in
Montana).
59. See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawfor LaborRelations: A Critique of the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L. J. 1357 (1983).
60. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
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CONCLUSION

It should be evident that I am sharply critical of modem legal innovations in both labor and real estate markets. The power of that critique, I
believe, is strengthened because it does not rest on any belief that property
rights should be absolute as a matter of divine or natural right. Quite the
opposite, the approach that I have taken here is to explain why deviations
from the ordinary rules governing land and labor are perfectly appropriate
in a number of very important institutional settings. But once it is understood why these resources require adjustments of the simpler common law
rules applicable to land and labor, it becomes clear that none of the reasons
that justify the complex system of government control for oil and gas, or
water, or information, carries over to the core cases of land and labor, which
are today.
In dealing with property as a fundamental right, then, the relevant
consideration often is not the form that the right takes, be it absolute or
qualified, but the shrinkage of the government role in making decisions as
to how resources will be used, or at what price they will be traded. The
system of decentralized control is necessary to limit the scope of arbitrary
government power, and to generate the information, through prices and
through private investigation, as to what resources are worth and how they
should be deployed. It is not necessary to believe that all rights are created
in nature in order to defend private property against attacks from ever more
aggressive schemes of public regulation. The utilitarian considerations that
are often used to attack the institutions of property are, when properly
understood, one of the bulwarks of its defense.
There is today in this land a great uneasiness about our social and
economic future. There is a discontent with the current state of affairs, but
no clear agreement as what should be done to alter the situation. We are told
time and time again that what we need is better government, more responsive
government, more enlightened government, more caring government. The
emphasis is always on more better. I hope that this analysis of property
rights shows the error in these proscriptions, even after we take into account
all the nuances of the common law theories. But speaking globally, the
conclusion is too clear to require extended comment: Given where we are
today, we need less government and wider spheres of individual autonomy.
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